FILE NOS.: SCT-7001-24, SCT-7002-24 and SCT-7003-24
CITATION: 2025 SCTC 7
DATE: 20251029

SPECIFIC CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

TRIBUNAL DES REVENDICATIONS PARTICULIÈRES

BETWEEN:	
QAYQAYT FIRST NATION Claimant (Applicant)	Ron Maurice, Ryan Lake, Melanie Webber and Paige Thomas, for the Claimant (Applicant)
– and –	
HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF CANADA As represented by the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations Respondent (Respondent)	Peri Smith, James Mackenzie and Lauren Sapic, for the Respondent (Respondent)
	HEARD: via written submissions

REASONS ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE

Honourable Victoria Chiappetta, Chairperson

NOTE: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form.

Cases Cited:

Horani v Manulife Financial Corporation, 2023 ONCA 51; *Fulop v Corrigan*, 2020 ONSC 1648; *LM v Children's Aid Society of Cape Breton*, 1999 NSCA 101; *The Children's Aid Society of Toronto v SC*, 2017 ONCJ 240; *GMAC v TCT Logistics Inc*, 2006 SCC 35; *Collins v Canada*, 2015 FCA 281; *Saskatchewan (AG) Witchekan Lake First Nation*, 2023 FCA 105.

Statutes and Regulations Cited:

Specific Claims Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure, SOR/2011-119, rr 2, 30, 60.

Specific Claims Tribunal Act, SC 2008, c 22, preamble, s 13.

Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 48.04.

*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Ac*t, RSC 1985, c B-3, s 215.

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, rr 213, 214, 215.

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I. INTRODUCTION

[1] There are currently three Declarations of Claim before the Specific Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) filed by the Qayqayt First Nation (Qayqayt or Claimant). The Claims relate to three reserves which, Qayqayt alleges, were established for its exclusive use and occupation between 1860 and 1862, but which were later illegally taken by the Crown. The Respondent denies the allegations in the three Declarations of Claim.

[2] The first Claim, Tribunal file number SCT-7001-24, relates to what the Claimant refers to as the "City Reserves" which was made up of a number of lots to the west of the City of New Westminster at the time (these lots are part of the city now). The second Claim, Tribunal file number SCT-7002-24, relates to what the Claimant refers to as the "Poplar Island Reserve" which is located in the northern arm of the Fraser River to the west of the City of New Westminster (again, at the time). The third Claim, Tribunal file number SCT-7003-24, relates to what the Claimant refers to as the "South New Westminster Reserve" or the "Brownsville Reserve" which is located on the south shore of the Fraser River, directly opposite the City of New Westminster.

[3] On September 5, 2025, the Claimant submitted for filing an Application for Leave and Notice of Application for partial summary judgment in all three Claims before the Tribunal. If granted leave, the Claimant asserted it would seek the following relief:

> i. a determination that the New Westminster Indian Band, now known as Qayqayt, was, at all material times, a "band" within the meaning of pre-confederation law and policy, the various iterations of the *Indian Act* and at common law;
>
> ii. a determination that the Crown created a reserve for the use and benefit of the New Westminster Indian Band at the City Lots;
>
> iii. a determination that the Crown created a reserve for the use and benefit of the New Westminster Indian Band at Brownsville;
>
> iv. a determination that the Crown created a reserve for the use and benefit of the New Westminster Indian Band at Poplar Island;
>
> v. costs on a solicitor and client, full indemnity basis; and
>
> vi. such further and other relief as counsel may advise and this Honourable Tribunal may deem just. [Claimant's Notice of Application and Application for Partial Summary Judgment (Application or Claimant's Submissions), dated September 5, 2025, at para. 1]

[4] In its response to the Claimant's Application, the Respondent reiterated that it "denies the assertions contained in the three Declarations of Claim" and argued that the Tribunal should not grant leave "because it is plain and obvious that the intended application does not disclose a reasonable prospect of success" (Response of His Majesty the King in Right of Canada to Application for Leave and Notice of Application by the Claimant for Summary Judgment (Respondent's Submissions), dated September 12, 2025, at paras. 2, 8).

[5] Having reviewed the Claimant's Submissions and the Respondent's Submissions, as submitted to the Tribunal, I concluded that leave should not be granted. Upon advising the Parties via a Direction dated September 16, 2025, that leave was denied with reasons to follow, the Claimant requested permission to file a reply to the Respondent's Submissions. I granted its request.

[6] In its reply, the Claimant clarified that the Application is for "partial" summary judgment because "[t]he remaining issue—whether there was an unlawful taking of [Qayqayt's] reserves—is a genuine issue requiring trial" (Claimant's Reply to Response of His Majesty the King in Right of Canada to Application for Leave and Notice of Application by the Claimant for Partial Summary Judgment (Claimant's Reply Submissions), dated September 26, 2025, at para. 2).

[7] Having reviewed the Claimant's Reply Submissions, I remain of the view that leave should be denied. The reasons for denying leave are set out below.

II. GRANTING LEAVE TO APPLY AT THE SPECIFIC CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

[8] Rule 30 of the *Specific Claims Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure*, SOR/2011-119, [*Tribunal Rules*], controls when leave of the Tribunal is required to make an application. It reads:

> **Leave required**
> **30** Except for an application referred to in the Act, subrule 60(2) or Part 11, leave of the Tribunal is required before an application can be made to the Tribunal.

[9] Applications for summary judgment are not referred to in the *Specific Claims Tribunal Act*, SC 2008, c 22 [*SCTA*], including in subrule 60(2) or Part 11. Therefore, an application for summary judgment requires leave of the Tribunal before it can be brought.

[10] There is good reason for the Tribunal to require a potential applicant seek leave prior to

bringing an application. The very essence of the Tribunal lies in its efforts to adjudicate specific claims in accordance with the law and in a just and timely manner. While it can be a difficult balance, the Tribunal has long considered efficiency to be a major aspect of its mandate: the timeliness of the Tribunal's adjudication is reinforced in the *SCTA*'s preamble, and Rule 2 directs that the *Tribunal Rules* must be interpreted and applied "so as to secure the just, timely and cost-effective resolution of specific claims while taking the cultural diversity and the distinctive character of specific claims into account."

[11] The requirement for leave to make applications before the Tribunal, therefore, is meant to ensure that only applications that serve the mandate of the Tribunal in accordance with the direction of Rule 2 of the *Tribunal Rules* will be heard.

[12] There is no universal test for granting leave in Canadian jurisprudence. In most courts, applications and motions that are brought in accordance with the rules of civil procedure in a particular jurisdiction will be heard as of right, and situations where leave of a court is necessary to bring a motion or application are few. Where leave is required, courts tend to favour a permissive, flexible approach that seeks to balance the merits of a proposed application with procedural fairness and judicial efficiency.

[13] For example, under rule 48.04 of the *Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure*, RRO 1990, Reg 194, a party that has set down an action for trial cannot make or continue motions for discovery without leave of the court. In *Horani v Manulife Financial Corporation*, 2023 ONCA 51, the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote that the "proper test for granting leave to bring a motion" under this rule "is subject to some disagreement among Ontario courts" (para. 16). The court identified two, somewhat separate, threads:

- first, there is a line of cases that demands that the moving party show a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances that would make the refusal to hear a motion unjust (para. 17, citing *Hill v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd*, [1992] OJ No 1740, 11 CPC (3d) 236 (Gen Div)); and

- second, there is another line of cases that offers a more permissive approach to granting leave, determining that the moving party must show that "the interlocutory

> step is necessary in the interests of justice" (para. 18, citing *AGC Mechanical Structural Security Inc v Rizzo*, 2013 ONSC 1316 at para. 21).

While the court preferred the latter approach in context, it refused to clarify which line of cases held sway, finding "that it is not necessary to determine the appropriate test" (para. 38).

[14] In *Fulop v Corrigan*, 2020 ONSC 1648, while considering the same rule of civil procedure, Perell J. of the Ontario Superior Court wrote that the "predominant contemporary approach to whether leave should be granted is a flexible approach that recognizes that there may be no single test for leave" (para. 77). Even while recognizing that there is "no single test," he went on to offer guidelines, writing:

> In considering whether there is justification for granting leave, the court may consider a variety of factors including: (1) what the party seeking leave knew at the time of the passing of the trial record; (2) whether there has been a substantial or unexpected chang[e] in the circumstances since the action was set down for trial; (3) the purpose of the request for leave; (4) the nature of the relief being requested; (5) whether the party opposing the relief would suffer any prejudice; and (6) whether the relief sought would likely be granted if leave were given to bring the motion notwithstanding the filing of the trial record.

[15] In a family law context, flexibility that balances efficiency and justice remains the focus. In *LM v Children's Aid Society of Cape Breton*, 1999 NSCA 101, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal noted that where leave is required it is "not merely a formality" but "a matter of substance" (para. 68). In *The Children's Aid Society of Toronto v SC*, 2017 ONCJ 240, the Ontario Court of Justice wrote that any judicial determination on leave "must be done in the context of the philosophy and goals and requirements of the Act" under which the application is brought (para. 21, citing *Children's Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v Jennifer Ann M-F*, 2011 ONCJ 533 at para. 23).

[16] Even in a business law context, flexibility and balance are important. In *GMAC v TCT Logistics Inc*, 2006 SCC 35, the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider the requirements for granting leave under section 215 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Ac*t, RSC 1985, c B-3, which forbids legal action against "the Superintendent, an official receiver, an interim receiver or a trustee" except with leave of the court. The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the requirements for granting leave were permissive, writing, "where, as here, it cannot be said that the Union's claim is frivolous or without an evidentiary foundation, it should be allowed to

proceed" (para. 80).

[17] Some of the above factors are applicable only in their specific context but, with some necessary alterations, many of these factors can be applied at the Tribunal in considering applications for leave.

[18] The timing of a motion is an important factor under rule 48.04 of the *Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure*, RRO 1990, Reg 194, and, by barring pre-trial motions once the decision has been made to proceed to trial, the rules appear to be written in an effort to encourage efficiency. Similarly, questions about the nature of the relief requested and the purpose of the request for leave seem connected to the need for judicial efficiency. The question of a change in circumstances appears to be more connected to the promotion of justice by taking into account the true context in which the motion is brought. Justice is also the main driver behind factors such as the context of the Act, the potential for success and prejudice to the other party. Requiring an evidentiary foundation in order to grant leave is connected to both justice and efficiency, as well as procedural fairness.

[19] Taking into account the above factors, as well as the Tribunal's mandate, the following factors ought to be considered when determining an application for leave:

1. **The Timing of the Application for Leave:** This includes whether any evidence has been heard and the nature of that evidence. For instance, depending on the relief requested, certain applications may be inappropriate before oral history evidence has been heard, whereas other applications, such as leave to intervene, may be inappropriate if significant evidentiary hearings have already occurred, and a party would suffer prejudice.

2. **The Purpose of the Application for Leave:** As noted, the Tribunal requires parties to apply for leave in many more circumstances than a court. Defining the purpose of the application for leave is therefore an important factor in weighing the sometimes-competing aspects of the merits of the application, procedural fairness and judicial economy, while also giving the Tribunal the opportunity to dismiss applications that are frivolous.

3. **The Nature of the Relief Sought:** The nature of the relief sought in the proposed application is also an important factor in weighing the merits of the application, procedural fairness and judicial economy. For example, an application for summary judgment could end the claim without hearing any evidence, whereas an application for party status could add an additional party, increasing costs for the existing parties and decreasing the Tribunal's efficiency, but potentially increasing the justice achieved.

4. **Whether Any Party Would Suffer Prejudice:** This is slightly different than Perell J.'s construction, and more encompassing. Given that the Tribunal's mandate is to resolve specific claims in an effort to promote reconciliation between First Nations and the Crown in a general sense, there may be interests other than the parties that demand consideration in the appropriate context.

5. **Whether the Relief Sought is Possible:** Again, this is slightly different than Perell J.'s construction and is more permissive. The Tribunal need not consider the actual potential for success but should, instead, dismiss applications for leave if it is plain and obvious that they are doomed to fail.

6. **Whether There is an Evidentiary Foundation:** Applicants and respondents must provide an evidentiary foundation within the application or response itself to show why leave is or is not warranted. They cannot promise to prove the evidentiary foundation at an eventual hearing after leave has been granted, as this threatens not only the efficiency of the Tribunal and its ability to do justice, but is unfair to the opposing party because they will not know the case they need to meet.

7. **The Context of the *SCTA* and the Mandate of the Tribunal:** All decisions regarding leave should be made through the lens of the Tribunal's mandate to promote reconciliation by adjudicating specific claims in accordance with law and in a just and timely manner.

III. APPLICATIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[20] Rule 5 of the *Tribunal Rules* directs that the Tribunal may provide for any matter of practice

or procedure not provided for in the *Tribunal Rules* by analogy to the *Federal Courts Rules*, SOR/98-106. Summary judgment is governed by the Federal Court's rules 213–215 which read, in part:

> **213 (1)** A party may bring a motion for summary judgment or summary trial on all or some of the issues raised in the pleadings at any time after the defendant has filed a defence but before the time and place for trial have been fixed.
>
> …
>
> **214** A response to a motion for summary judgment shall not rely on what might be adduced as evidence at a later stage in the proceedings. It must set out specific facts and adduce the evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
>
> **215 (1)** If on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.
>
> …
>
> **215 (3)** If the Court is satisfied that there is a genuine issue of fact or law for trial with respect to a claim or defence, the Court may
>
> > **(a)** nevertheless determine that issue by way of summary trial and make any order necessary for the conduct of the summary trial; or
> >
> > **(b)** dismiss the motion in whole or in part and order that the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judgment, proceed to trial or that action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.

[21] Similar to the leave requirement, an application for summary judgment can be a significant instrument to serve the mandate of the Tribunal and the direction of Rule 2 of the *Tribunal Rules*. If the undisputed material facts of the claim applied to the applicable jurisprudence shows that there is no genuine issue for trial, a hearing is unnecessary and a decision can be made based only on the paper record. It can be a more efficient way of resolving disputes than a prolonged hearing with *viva voce* evidence.

[22] The process and analysis of resolving a claim summarily are necessarily detailed and complex. If leave is granted, to succeed on its application for summary judgment, the Claimant would bear the ultimate burden of proving its case beyond a balance of probabilities. As noted in *Collins v Canada*, 2015 FCA 281, "[i]t must be beyond doubt that no genuine issue for trial exists" (para. 70, citing *Pioneer Exploration Inc (Trustee of) v Euro-Am Pacific Enterprises Ltd*, 2003 ABCA 298 at para. 19).

[23] In terms of the process for granting leave on a motion for summary judgment, it is prudent to be guided by Rennie JA, who wrote:

> The determination of whether a genuine issue for trial exists must, either explicitly or implicitly, follow a certain analytical path. The legal issues in dispute and their associated evidentiary requirements must be identified. The factual issues in dispute must then be extracted and assessed in light of their relevancy to the legal issues. Only when these questions have been answered can the sufficiency of the motion record be assessed. [*Saskatchewan (AG) v Witchekan Lake First Nation*, 2023 FCA 105 at para. 38]

[24] While the determination to be made in this decision is solely on the subject of leave, given the nature of the request for leave, the above considerations on an application for summary judgment may influence the analysis of the factors to be considered by the Tribunal on an application for leave.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Timing of the Application for Leave

[25] Beginning with the timing of the application for leave, it is notable that on August 27, 2025, prior to filing this Application, the Claimant consented to the addition of the Squamish Nation (Squamish) as an intervenor in Tribunal file number SCT-7003-24. The Respondent had already consented to the addition of Squamish as an intervenor, in its response to Squamish's Application for Leave and Notice of Application, dated July 31, 2025. Squamish has not yet been "officially" added as an intervenor, as the Respondent initially did not consent to the draft order filed by the Claimant; however, the Parties have since filed a draft consent order, which the Tribunal expects to issue in the near future.

[26] In addition, seven other First Nations have been granted leave to apply for party or intervenor status and are currently preparing for a hearing on those issues scheduled for May 2026.

[27] The Tribunal also notes that no evidentiary hearings have been held in these Claims. The Respondent argues that at least one of the issues cannot be determined on the basis of affidavit evidence—the issue of whether Qayqayt has been a First Nation "at all material times"—and "will need to be considered with the benefit of oral history and elder testimony, as well as the historical documents" (Respondent's Submissions at paras. 6, 38). The Claimant argues that the facts already set out, as well as the Claimant's proposed affidavit evidence, "can provide a sufficient foundation

for a determination without the need for multiple viewpoints" and asserts that "where the evidence is clear, oral elder testimony is not required as it is already reflected in the written historical record" (Claimant's Reply Submissions at para. 36).

[28] The question of existing evidence and prejudice to potential parties is considered in greater detail below but, given that the Claimant's application for leave was submitted after its consent to Squamish's intervention, and the fact that no evidentiary hearings have been held, the timing factor militates against granting leave.

B. The Purpose of the Application for Leave

[29] The purpose of the application for leave is to ultimately achieve partial summary judgment. Partial summary judgment would narrow the issues in these Claims, thereby saving time, saving money and fulfilling the Tribunal's mandate for both justice and efficiency. This militates in favour of granting leave.

C. The Nature of the Relief Sought

[30] The nature of the relief sought is partial summary judgment. Again, partial summary judgment is typically a positive development, and one that fits with the Tribunal's mandate for efficiency. This would militate in favour of granting leave, however, if partial summary judgment would be inappropriate in and of itself, then the Tribunal's mandate for justice would militate against granting leave.

D. Whether Any Party Would Suffer Prejudice

[31] As noted above, both the Claimant and the Respondent have consented to the addition of Squamish as an intervenor, despite the ongoing uncertainty of the wording of the eventual Tribunal Order granting intervenor status. Seven additional First Nations have been granted leave to apply for party or intervenor status.

[32] While it is atypical to consider pleadings in a separate application when determining the Application at bar, under the authority of paragraph 13(1)(b) of the *SCTA*, which grants the Tribunal the ability to "receive and accept any evidence … whether or not that evidence or information is or would be admissible in a court of law", I will refer briefly to Squamish's pleadings in its own application for leave to illustrate how prejudice could result from a partial

summary judgment in these Claims.

[33] Squamish has asserted that it has an interest in what the Claimant calls the "Brownsville Reserve" and Squamish calls "*Kikáyt*." Although Squamish does not assert an exclusive interest directly in its Application for Leave and Notice of Application, it says that "*Kikáyt* was occupied year-round by Squamish families relying on sturgeon fishing throughout the year" and that "[w]hile Squamish welcomed visitors to *Kikáyt* and shared its resources, *Kikáyt* was a Squamish place" which implies exclusivity (paras. 13, 15). The Tribunal certainly does not accept these bald assertions as fact, but the existence of these assertions creates a triable issue that cannot be determined on the existing evidence without significant prejudice to Squamish.

[34] In addition, and again relying on paragraph 13(1)(b) of the *SCTA* to allow for the consideration of third-party correspondence, on September 9, 2025, the Tribunal received a letter from the Kwantlen First Nation—one of the seven First Nations that have been granted leave to apply for party or intervenor status—which asserted that allowing the Claimant to apply for summary judgment prior to hearing the applications for party or intervenor status would "seriously prejudice the Applicants" (p. 2). The Kwantlen First Nation further asserted that its letter was written "with the support of several of the other nations including Squamish Nation" (p. 1).

[35] The creation of prejudice to other parties militates against granting leave.

E. Whether the Relief Sought is Possible

[36] The relief sought in the ultimate application for which the Claimant seeks leave is partial summary judgment. This partial summary judgment would make a final determination of four of the central issues in Qayqayt's three Claims:

1. That "at all material times" the New Westminster Indian Band, now known as Qayqayt, was a "band" under the *Indian Act*;

2. That the Crown created a reserve for the use and benefit of the New Westminster Indian Band at the City Reserves;

3. That the Crown created a reserve for the use and benefit of the New Westminster Indian Band at Brownsville; and

4. That the Crown created a reserve for the use and benefit of the New Westminster Indian Band at Poplar Island.

[37] The Claimant argues that these four determinations can be made on the strength of the record as it presently exists, as well as on the evidence it says it will present at an eventual hearing. Even if the Claimant could present significant evidence at an eventual hearing, however, I am not convinced that this would be sufficient to make the determinations it seeks. Instead, I agree with the Respondent that the nature of the three Declarations of Claim involve material facts and questions of law that do not lend themselves to determination by summary judgment. Rather, they involve contested assertions of material facts and law that require a trial to determine. On this basis, it does not appear that the relief requested is possible within the context of the proposed application: in other words, the ultimate application for partial summary judgment the Claimant seeks to make is doomed to fail. This militates strongly against granting leave.

F. Whether There is an Evidentiary Foundation

[38] There also appears to be an insufficient evidentiary foundation to grant leave. In its Reply Submissions, the Claimant asserts that it may rely on the following evidence to support its application for partial summary judgment:

> a) written submissions;
>
> b) the Respondent's documents list of 2014;
>
> c) the Respondent's documents list of 2025;
>
> d) the Claimant's documents list of 2025;
>
> e) the affidavit of Chief Rhonda Larrabee has been the Chief of QFN since 1994;
>
> f) the Affidavit of David Vogt, Historian; and
>
> g) the pleadings herein. [Claimant's Reply Submissions at para. 48]

[39] Unfortunately, this is the full extent to which the Claimant particularizes the evidence it promises to present. The Claimant has failed therefore to identify any particulars of the evidence that, if leave were granted, it intends to rely upon to prove the material facts it has asserted to be true, to establish there is no genuine issue for a hearing.

[40] Further, and as noted above, the Respondent has argued that the issue of Qayqayt's status as a band cannot be determined without oral history and documentary evidence, while the Claimant asserts that "where the evidence is clear, oral elder testimony is not required as it is already reflected in the written historical record" (Claimant's Reply Submissions at para. 36). This assertion, however, appears to contradict what little evidence the Tribunal is currently privy to. Whereas Qayqayt argues that the Tribunal already has enough evidence to determine that "at all material times" it was a band under the *Indian Act*, in one of the Claimant's Declarations of Claim it quotes a June 9, 1879, letter from Malcolm Sproat, the Indian Reserve Commissioner, in which Sproat claims "that there were 'no New Westminster Indians proper'" and that "the City Reserves were 'not assigned to any particular tribe'" (Declaration of Claim in Tribunal file number SCT-7001-24, dated June 20, 2024, at para. 40).

[41] This is only one example of the Claimant offering a broad assertion that appears to be contradicted by the existing evidence. Whether this contradiction can be explained or Sproat was correct is a question of fact that the Tribunal cannot determine via the evidence that exists, nor on the evidence that the Claimant has asserted it will present at the proposed hearing.

[42] The lack of evidentiary foundation upon which the Tribunal could grant leave militates against granting leave.

G. The Context of the *SCTA* and the Mandate of the Tribunal

[43] Finally, given the impending addition of Squamish as an intervenor in Tribunal file number SCT-7003-24, and the seven additional applications for party or intervenor status for all three of Qayqayt's Claims, the context of the *SCTA* militates against granting leave. According to the Act's preamble, the mandate of the Tribunal is to adjudicate specific claims "in accordance with law and in a just and timely manner". Qayqayt has made three Claims, but multiple nearby First Nations have presented *prima facie* cases for their own claims over the same land, such that they have been granted leave to apply to become parties or intervenors to Qayqayt's Claims. It is, of course, unknown at this point whether these First Nations will be successful in their applications, but the existence of these *prima facie* claims makes it impossible to grant summary judgment without a complete record.

V. CONCLUSION

[44] For these reasons, I have concluded that it is plain and obvious that the intended Application does not disclose a reasonable prospect of success and leave is therefore denied.

[45] The dates of March 25–26, 2026, previously set aside by the Tribunal in its Direction dated August 29, 2025, for the hearing of the potential application, are vacated.

VICTORIA CHIAPPETTA

Honourable Victoria Chiappetta, Chairperson

SPECIFIC CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

TRIBUNAL DES REVENDICATIONS PARTICULIÈRES

Date: 20251029

File Nos.: SCT-7001-24, SCT-7002-24 and SCT-7003-24

OTTAWA, ONTARIO October 29, 2025

PRESENT: Honourable Victoria Chiappetta, Chairperson

BETWEEN:

QAYQAYT FIRST NATION

Claimant (Applicant)

and

HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF CANADA
As represented by the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations

Respondent (Respondent)

COUNSEL SHEET

TO:	**Counsel for the Claimant (Applicant) QAYQAYT FIRST NATION** As represented by Ron Maurice, Ryan Lake, Melanie Webber and Paige Thomas Maurice Law Barristers & Solicitors
AND TO:	**Counsel for the Respondent (Respondent)** As represented by Peri Smith, James Mackenzie and Lauren Sapic Department of Justice